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FEUDALISM AND THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR 
Nicholas Wright 
No-one who makes a study of the Hundred Years War can for 
long remain ignorant of the vastly different approaches to the 
subject pursued by French and by English-speaking historians. 
Although the term "Hundred Years War" was a mid-nineteenth 
century French invention, imported into England by Edward 
Freeman,l and although the classic work on the subject was written, 
nearly forty years ago, by a Sorbonne professor, Edouard Perroy 
(who had spent many years teaching and researching in Britain),2 
there is a sense in which the Hundred Years War is now the preserve 
of English-speaking historians. With very few exceptions, English3 
historians have tended to concentrate upon the political and military 
features of the relationship between England and France during 
the late Middle Ages, and have made of them the defining 
characteristics of the Hundred Years War. The English still occupy 
the deserted battlefields of Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt; the 
campaign-trails of Edward III, the Black Prince, John of Gaunt, 
Henry V; and parts of the lost provinces of the Plantagenet empire: 
Malcolm Vale in Gascony, Christopher Allmand in Normandy, 
Michael Jones in Brittany. Theirs is essentially a "view from 
the top": from inside the councils of princes where the grand 
strategies were worked out, and in the company of the military 
aristocracy as it implemented, or failed to implement, these 
strategies. The French, on the other hand, have tended, at least 
since the time of Michelet, to regard the Anglo-French wars as 
simply one element in a much wider crisis of late-medieval French 
society. In the feverish days of the late-nineteenth century (and 
occasionally today), this crisis was expressed in terms of the 
birth-pangs of the French nation; more recently, it has been 
expressed in economic terms: thus Boutruche and his "crisis of 
a society", or Bois and his "crisis of feudalism".4 Perroy, it seems 
to me, was infected a little by the nineteenth-century nationalistic 
fever as he wrote The Hundred Years War while playing, (to use 
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his own words), "an game of hide--and-seek with the 
Gestapo".5 But, within a few years, he allowed himself to be 
brought back into line when he wrote that the Hundred Years 
War was "not very murderous" and that it would have had no 
gr·eat effect on the French people but the massive burden 
of royal taxation and other fiscal 
It would be mischievous and to suggest that Hundred 
Years War scholarship has been by a crude xenophobia: 
exulting in national triumphs (if rather faded ones) and 
national humiliations in the vast spaces of "total" history. 
historians, with Kenneth Fowler prominent amongst them, 
often emphasized the great complexity and intense localization 
of so much of the Anglo-French wars on French soil, where 
was to be found, if at all, on a personal, rather than on a 
basis. 7 Rodnev Hilton, when he does turn his attention brieflv 
to the Hundred Years iVar, relegates it to a junior role in a . 
of "social crises" of the late Middle Ages which he calls, 
thoroughly French (and Marxist) fashion, the crisis of 
On the other side of the Channel, Philippe Contamine has minutely 
examined the armies of the Valois kings which Michelet considered 
too feeble and corrupt to be worthy of anything more than casual 
vituperation in any national history.9 Nevertheless, the division 
of labour between French and English historians which encourages 
the English to study the war without much of the French 
socio-economic context, and the French to study the socio-economic 
context without much of the war, however profitable it mav 
be for the ultimate synthesis,- has proved to be somewhat unfruitf~l 
in terms of cross-Channel scholarly today. The 
frontier-territory in which shots are still exchanged 
is where the French social historians meet political 
and militarv specialists in the borderlands of fifteenth_::centurv 
Normandy. · Here the English occupying forces had been busily 
hanging as bandits persons whom Charles VII's supporters then, 
and many French historians now, claimed as 
against the English oppressors. The English, without recent 
experience of foreign occupation, are inclined to a less generous 
view of the Norman brig·ands)O 
Marc Bloch, who, on 16 July 1944, paid the supreme price 
of enemy occupation, and whose Feudal Society is the unifying 
theme of this conference, must accept sorne of the responsibility 
for these radically different trends in Hundred Years War 
scholarship. The revolution in French which he 
and his colleagues and successors on the d'Histoire 
Economique et Sociale have brought about in France has been 
so complete that the pre-revolutionary (as it were) 
of Delisle, Delachenal, Dupont-Ferrier, Denifle, and Perroy (in 
his unregeneratecl state), has been all but swept away. The English 
historians, especially of the Huncli'ed Years War, have maintained 
a Burkean distance from the violent events place on the 
other side of the Channel. They have an interest in 
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in the context of French feudal societv, as understood bv Marc 
Bloch, and which combines something ·of, with something more 
than, the "aristocratic" and the "economic" interpretations which 
are currently fashionable. 
The social and economic conditions of France during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries represent not so much a logical 
continuation of Bloch's "second feudal age" in which the nobility's 
political independence and arbitrar-y authority were being eroded 
from above by a powerful Capetian monarchy, and from below 
by a self-confident and assertive peasantry and bourgeoisie with 
money to purchase an end to arbitrary lordship, but rather a 
reversion to the conditions which gave birth to feudalism itself, 
in the "first feudal age" of the ninth and tenth centuries. Marc 
Bloch's first feudal age was characterized by a "great and universal 
decline in population".l4 So too was France in the late Middle 
Ages. In eastern Normandy, which is Guy Bois' area of study, 
the drop in population between 1347 and 1442 meant that "where 
about ten people had once lived, there were now only three")5 
During the first feudal age the general insecurity of life "induced 
men to draw nearer to each other", into "aggregations" of people 
living "cheek by jowl" but separated from others by empty spaces: 
the wilderness enveloped and encroached upon these villages and 
upon the amble land in their immediate vicinity.16 Jean de Venette 
in the fourteenth century, and Thomas Basin in the fifteenth, 
are nowhere more lyrical than when they wrote of the encroachment 
of wilderness upon the once-productive fields of France: "The 
eye of man was no longer rejoiced by the accustomed sight of 
green pastures and fields charmingly coloured by the growing 
grain, but rather saddened by the looks of the nettles and thistles 
springing up on every side".l7 We now know, too, that the dramatic 
fall in the population of late-medieval France was not reflected 
in a proportionate abandonment of villages: a very strong indication 
that the gener·al insecurity of life then, as in the first feudal age, 
"induced men to draw nearer to each other" and to abandon the 
peripheral areas of cultivation for the more productive areas 
immediately surrounding the villages.l8 Even before we examine 
in detail the impact on the French countryside of what was often 
portrayed at the time as the "barbarian invasions" of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, we should be aware of some of the general 
similarities between that society and the Carolingian society 
which reeled before the Viking invaders four centuries earlier. 
Let us begin by acknowledging that the aristocratic bias of 
many of the English accounts of the Hundred Years War reflects 
a fundamental reality: that the war essentially belonged to the 
Anglo-French aristocracy. This small group, hardly more than 
three-per-cent of the total population, provided the war's leadership 
and direction;l9 it ensured that the war continued almost 
indefinitely because it permitted the fulfilment of the noble ideal 
of the warrior while channeling a large proportion of the profits 
of war, in wages, ransoms, and booty, to boost its dwindling 
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traditional revenues from land;20 it established the rules by which 
the war was fought, and bore the brunt of actual combat.21 If 
the Hundred Years War could be described as a series of battles 
in which rich prisoners were taken, of assaults on towns which 
yielded massive booties, and of military campaigns in which soldiers 
might hav('l expected all of these profits in addition to their wages, 
we might be justified in thinking (after due acknowledgement 
of the role of the common soldiers) that the war itself was a 
thoroughly aristocratic affair. Innocent non-combatants may 
have suffered during the sack of towns, or by being caught up 
in the destructive passage of an army on campaign, but they would 
have to be regarded as war's tragic waste-products rather than 
part of its living substance. A war, however, which lasted for 
more than one hundred years and which consisted largely of uneasy 
peace rather than of active war-making, cannot be so described.22 
Rather it was a way of life: a habit of violence and the expectation 
thereof which grew and flourished in all classes of society in the 
long shadows of the warring sovereigns of England and of France, 
and which became part of the very social fabric of France. In 
a world given over to violence and the expectation of violence 
a warrior class may be expected to do well, just as it did during 
the turbulence of Marc Bloch's first feudal age. That is not to 
say, however, that the war is any more fully comprehended by 
a detailed study of that warrior-caste than was Marc Bloch's feudal 
society. War in the Middle Ages, as Jean-Philippe Genet has 
recently reminded us, was not an accidental disorder, but a natural 
product of a society organized for war.23 What is true for the 
Middle Ages generally is doubly true for France in the late Middle 
Ages when war had become endemic. 
The soldiers of the Hundred Years War were as heterogeneous 
as the wider, male, society whence they carne and · jnto which 
they were finally absorbed. They included kings, princes, dukes, 
counts, viscounts, barons; occasionally bishops and archbishops. 
They included knights banneret and knights bachel01·, squires 
banneret and simple squires, who, though vastly different in social 
status, private wealth and military rank, were united by their 
noble style of warfare and by their· sense of caste. Beneath them, 
and always subject to their orders, were the common soldiers 
who normally fought on foot: the archers, crossbowmen, sergeants, 
pillars and brigands. These common soldiers ranged from the 
thoroughly professional foreign mercenaries, such as the Genoese 
crossbowman who served in the French armies, to the criminal 
vagabonds who drifted in and out of service in order to secure 
a royal pardon, and as they found masters to employ them as varlets 
and pillars. Their only common feature was their non-noble style 
of warfare. Cutting across these horizontal lines which divided 
the soldiers of the Hundred Years War according to their social 
and military status were the vertical ones of allegiance. There 
were moments during that long war, especially during the fragile 
peace of the 1360s, when companies of soldiers appeared on the 
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Hundred Years iVar than the 
localized and relatively static 
in which soldiers had moved 
in their area of operation. 
wars with which soldiers and civilians but 
its vast complexity and its often very tenuous connection with 
the grand strategies of and councils make it a 
unfamiliar face to us. So indeed that the 
of the Hundred Years 
war was "peu 
This relatively static warfare, in and around local 
was the daily fare of the several thousand soldiers who 
living from war in France: the men who, with the Bascot de 
Mauleon, greeted news of the treaty of with dismay, 
or who might, like Sir John Hawkwood, sharply to 
the innocent greeting "Peace be with These were the 
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continuity to the Hundred Years War 
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other the into the field 
great armies 
could not 
their way, 
rely on such occasional paid 
best, three times in one 
The warfare 
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which tiny and forgotten 
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as we can. We will take tribute and 
appatissemens from our adversaries, and as much as we 
can. From those of our own side we will demand as modest 
a collection can, telling them their contributions 
will guarantee them 
It come as no surprise to those familiar with the 
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hand-to-mouth methods by which kings raised revenue in the Middle 
Ages, and with the ramshackle bureaucracy responsible for its 
disbursement to military captains, that it "pleased" the king very 
rarely to sustain his scattered garrisons with victuals and money, 
and that it "pleased" him very much to have them find such victuals 
and money where they could. The future Charles V, when regent, 
sent letters to the captain of Etampes in 1358 authorizing him 
to live off the countryside because he had no wages: "Because 
the aforesaid captain and his men have no wages from us, we 
have granted by our said letters full licence and authority to take 
from the countryside ••. all manner of victuals needful for 
men-at-arms".35 From the point of view of the regent and his 
captains, it was both necessary and reasonable that in time of 
crisis the public authority should allow its officers directly to 
expropriate the king's taxes, rather than rely upon the collection 
of a taille and its disbursement through the treasurers of wars. 
An agent of the Datini business empire, however, expressed the 
way local people tended to view this licence to plunder: "it seems 
to us that their soldiers do more harm to those who are subject 
to them than they ever did to those who refused obedience, and 
all because they cannot obtain their pay".36 There were, of course, 
exceptions. The English garrisons of Calais, and the Calais March, 
during the fourteenth century were financed almost entirely by 
the English Exchequer,37 and the English garrisons in Normandy 
during Bedford's regency were substantially, though by no means 
completely, financed froin taxes voted by the Norman Estates. 
Elsewhere, "Crathor rules" applied almost universally, and all 
but the most privileged captains in royal service lived off the 
tribute paid to them by "friendly" non-combatants in payment 
for their own protection, and off the ransoms of "enemy" 
non-combatants who had acquired enemy-status by seeking 
protection from the "wrong" people. Thus emerged a formula 
for oppression which covered all possible contingencies. The word 
"contributions" which was the delicate term used by the captain 
of Crathor in Le Jouvencel to describe protection payments may 
have been viewed with the same irony which this cruel euphemism 
received during the Thirty Years War in the pages of 
Grimmelshausen. In Grimmelshausen's famous vision of the Tree 
of War, the "higher folk" who inhabited the upper branches of 
the tree, hacked at the peasants who were at its roots with knives 
called "war-contributions". But, "if the money would not out, 
then did the commissaries so handle them with rods (which thing 
they call military execution) that sighs came from their heart, 
tears from their eyes, blood from their nails, and the marrow 
from their bones".38 
The more successful the garrison was in extending its sway 
over the.villages of the surrounding countryside, the more it relied 
upon protection-money for its support, and the less it relied upon 
ransoms (appatissemens) from villages in enemy territory and 
the booty which came from the!Jl- in war-prizes. The frontier 
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between English territory and French territory may have been 
clear enough to the garrisons of Luc and Verset: they could almost 
see it from their crumbling battlements. But for the great captains 
of the teeming garrisons of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicornte in the 
eat'ly-1370s, there was no tower of the castle high enough for 
them to survey all of the 263 parishes which paid dearly for their 
protection.; nor, a decade or so later, could the captain of Brest 
perceive, at any one moment, the line in West Finisterre which 
separated his 120 parishes from those of another captain.39 If 
the resi$ort of the castle of Luc may be compared to the modest 
fief of an impoverished squire who needed to be constantly active 
in war in order to supplement his income, that of the castle of 
Saint-Sauveur may be compared to a great barony whose 
owner-occupier lived comfortably off the revenues of his estates, 
and who could not be removed, even by his own lord, without ample 
compensation or a successful assault. Indeed, the English captains 
of Saint-Sauveur in the 1360s and of Brest in the 1370s belonged 
to the new higher aristocracy of military talent which had been 
elevated from modest backgrounds by conspicuous service to the 
English Crown: Sir John Chandos, Hugh Calverley, Robert Knowles. 
The distinction which the captain of Crathor made, in Le 
Jouvencel, between appatissemens extracted from adversaries 
and contributions demanded from "those of our own side" was 
a hazy one even in the purely theoretical sense. How many 
appatissemens (collective ransoms) did a village have to pay before 
it could be considered to be "on the same side" as those who 
received them? For all practical purposes, however, there must 
have been no distinction at all. The money and goods extorted 
from the inhabitants of the villages which surrounded a fortress 
was protection-money in both the literal and pejorative senses 
of that term. The Bretons who occupied three fortresses in the 
Nievre in 1358 and 1359 were receiving money, "fat, cheeses, 
eggs, and other victuals and necessities" from the local people 
who paid "in order to be able to live peacefully in their homes, 
and to go about their work without the constant threat and fear 
of the aforesaid enernies".40 The immediate threat to the lives 
and property of the local people was posed by the garrisons 
themselves, and when the Mignart family entertained members 
of the garrison of Corvol-l'Orgueilleux in their horne, they claimed 
to be doing so "for fear that they might otherwise be killed and 
their buildings and goods burned and destroyed". We may assume, 
however, that the payment of protection-money, often called 
ransoms or patis, offered a certain security to the Mignart family 
against attacks from "outsiders" for as long as the Breton companies 
remained at Corvo!, Arthel, and Saint Reverien. Ttiose garrisons, 
even though they consisted only of freebooters, had a powerful 
interest in guarding the people who provided their material support. 
Perhaps they watched the peasants of their area of occupation, 
peacefully engaged in their labours, with as great a measure of 
satisfaction as any lord viewed his own tenants in more peaceful 
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circumstances, and, no doubt, they demanded heavy financial 
compensation for being pressed to evacuate their precious forts 
and to abandon their cle lordships in accordance with the 
terms of the treaty of 
Whether we focus our attention upon the great captains of 
companies, such as Seguin de Badefol 1Nhose safeconducts were 
respected throughout the l\1aconnais, For·ez, and 
Basse-Bourgogne during the I:lGOs, and which were drawn up in 
princely style,41 or· upon the squalid adventurers who occupied 
the fortified farmhouse of Corvol-l.'Orgueilleux and who terrorized 
the Mignart family in 1359, we see all of the problems and the 
opportunities of de f'acto lordship of land. The same conditions 
applied to the strategic fortress of Saint-Sauveur as to 
the forgotten little French garrison at Luc. The concept of armed 
protection in retum for material support provided, at one and 
the same time, the rationale of their existence (if they felt the 
need of one) and the means which made such an existence possible. 
So frequent are the reports of conflicts between of the 
same allegiance, and so abundant is the evidence of accommodations 
between garrisons of opposite allegiances, that one may suspect 
that protection of the ressort, or of the appatised, often 
enjoyed a higher priority amongst the of 
late-medieval France than their "official" war-aims. Jean Foliot, 
who had belonged to the French of Meauliou (? IV!eaulis, 
Manche), testified to an agreement made between the 
garrison of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte and some of the French 
gar!'isons of the Cotcntin to share between them the profits 
from collective ransoms and from individual 
rational wr1ich 
those who upon a 
the other hand, where the occupation-zones !1ad 
not been mutually between the various garrisons in the 
area, tension and were endemic whether or not the atea 
straddled an official frontier. The Norman of de 
which had been consistently loyal to the Crown 
the early part of the lluncJred Years War, supported itself at 
Lingevres (Calvados) by from tl1e count1·yside, 
without payment, "quantities gmins; 
bullocks, cows, sheep, hens, ewer, knives, sheets, 
clothes, iron ancl steel windows, and other things 
including horses and They were sometimes opposed 
by the neighboul'ing French garTison at Ellon, and thel'e were 
skirmishes. Both garrisons, no doubt, justified their existence 
by !'eference to "(the king's) enemies who were several 
fortresses in tlle district", as did Rogier de Forges 5, but 
their immediate priority was to secure tl1eir own support-oase 
-even at the expense of each other. 
Whether a captain, or· a soldier·, was, or was not, in receipt 
of wages from a public authority, was later to become the test 
of his legal status. There were brief periods during the Hundred 
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test between recognized combatants and 
bandits For most of that period, however, no 
public afford to employ on anything like a regular 
fraction of the soldiers who were battened upon 
The "vertica.l" ties of allegiance between 
a soldier and he served tended, as a consequence, 
only to be expressed in a negative way: the soldier demonstrated 
his loyalty to a lord not fighting against him or against his 
interests. The ties, especially those which bound together 
the r\nglo-French military aristocracy, and those who aspired 
to· its were of much significance. This 
enjoyed a a certain attitude 
often cut across lines of political demarcation. The 
rnilitary aristocracy of and squires, known as men-at-arms, 
each other in war, in tournaments, and in jousts, were 
of the pr•ofessional standards of their military 
too of their hazardous and adventurous 
stnndards of competence were 
often achieved by the and squires of the "free" companies 
who had contrived, not to make warfare into a way of life, 
but also explore the avenues of the knight's adventurous 
They were, as the Bascot de Mauh~on reported to Froissart, 
and trained in war as any people could be; as much 
for battle and in it to advantage, as 
and assaulting towns and However much 
and the lawyers of the insisted upon calling 
robbers (or low-born rather than 
"tmc there can be no doubt but that their leaders were 
an integral part the aristocratic world of their clay. Captains 
of companies, who had acquired their reputations as 
moved in and out of princely service with an ease 
no sense of impropriety: they married into the 
acquired titles, and achieved immortality 
Black Prince and Sir John Chandos in the pages 
or Froissart's Chronicles. "Arms ennoble the man": or, as Le 
ar·mes ennoblissent l'om me quel qui'il 
The aristocratic to life to which l refer is not fully 
comprehended by which, however broadly 
defined, concemed knightly values and 
noble class, its imitators and its aspirants.46 
the play-element so admirably described by 
serious element which has benefited from 
of Maurice Keen and Malcolm Vale and 
limitations and constraints upon armed conflict 
new associations between them 
political nature. armed knig·ht in conflict with 
concealed beneath the rich encrustation 
culture, was at its core. But there 
the aristocratic attitude to life than a 
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preparation for, and a participation in, armed conflict. The 
man-at-arms was a lord, or he aspired to be one, and even that 
most famous of knights-errant, Don Quixote, whose head had 
been turned completely by the romances of chivalry, "fancied 
himself crowned by the valour of his arms, at least with the empire 
of Trebizond" while his more hard-headed squire sustained himself 
with the vision of becoming the lord of "some isle".48 The heads 
which filled those massive helms and bascinets, which are now 
in the armow·y of the Tower of London and in the Musee de l'Armee 
in Paris, were ns filled with ideas about lordships to be won or 
pr·otected as they were with ambitions to serve their ladies and 
unhorse their opponents -- and a good deal more so than the head 
of Don Quixote. 
A lordship, usually of a rather temporary nature, might be 
acquired in the kingdom of France purely by force of arms. The 
Gascon squire who had the good fortune to make a stylish entry 
into Orthez under the very eye of that great fourteenth-century 
chronicler, Jean Froissart, arrived with a mule-train of possessions 
(including the silver plate off which he and his companions habitually 
dined), "like a great baron" (comme un grant baron).49 He had 
made his fortune in the French wars and, although he had had 
his share of rich ransoms and booty, his wealth derived largely 
from the occupation of land which he had won for himself in the 
French kingdom. In Picardy, for example, he was one of a number 
of adventurers in the service of .the king of Navarre who "were, 
for· a time, lords of the fields and the rivers (where) we and our 
friends won a great deal of wealth". Some time later, he and 
his friends captured La Charite-sur-Loire and, for a year and 
a half, "everything was ours along the Loire as far as Le Puy in 
Velay". Even in that very year, of 1388, when he encountered 
Froissart, he claimed to be drawing such a substantial yearly income 
fr·om the castle and lordship of Tlnu·ie, in the Tarn, that he would 
not have exchanged it for Orthez itself where the count of Foix 
and Bearn held his lavish court. He had not yet decided whether 
to sell Thurie to agents of the French Crown in the Auvergne, 
or to keep it to himself for a while longer. The name of this squire 
was Bascot de Mauleon. He had made himself more than merelv 
the good homme d'armes and the great captain which were th~ 
terms used by Sir Espan de Lion in his introduction to Froissart; 
he had also made himself into a great baron (because he lived 
like one). He would, however, have been forgotten, as were the 
hundred like him, but for those few idle hours before the fire 
in the hostelry of the Moon as the chronicler and the captain enjoyed 
the hospitality of Ernauton de Pin. 
If the French kingdom accommodated one hundred captains 
of garrisons who had acquired their lordships by force of arms, 
like the Bascot de Mauleon, it accommodated a thousand more 
who held charters and letters of commission which testified their 
rights to them. The garrison captain was sometimes tltc traditional 
lord who was organizing the defence of his own territory and peop.le. 
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The Norman knight, Jean de la Boissaye, who moved from one 
fortress to another in Normandy during the war between the kings 
of France and of Navarre in the late 1350s, installing garrisons 
"to guard and defend the (French king's) subjects from the 
men-at-arms who occupied many fortresses in the region, and 
who daily raided and plundered them", was certainly in one of 
his own manors, Le Boc Aliz, when organizing its defence against 
the Naverrese soldiers operating out of the fortified abbey of 
Cormeilles (Eure).50 It is doubtful, however, whether he held 
any commission from the regent, and it is certain that, by 1375, 
his freelance activities in the service of the French Crown had 
attr·acted the censure, not only of the royal officers of the bailliage 
of Caen, but also of the royal reformateurs of Lower Normandy. 
Henri de Coulombieres, another Norman knight, who was an 
important captain in French royal service between 1357 and 1381, 
had received a royal licence to fortify and garrison his mansion 
at Coulombieres (Calvados) before he became captain of Bayeux 
on 27 December 1357. During this period, and for the first nine 
months of his captaincy at Bayeux, he received no wages whatsoever 
from the Crown, making it inevitable, as he later claimed, that 
many things, such as corn, beverages, and beasts, should be taken 
from the local people without compensation. 51 
Sometimes the garrison captain was a foreigner to the district: 
inserted into a position of temporacy lordship by the proprietor 
of the castle or by a royal lieutenant. We may guess that a "foreign" 
captain of this sort, through his unfamiliarity with the customs 
which had, for generations, regulated the relationship between 
castle and village, or his indifference to them, may have played 
the tyrant more than a traditional lord might have done who wished 
to safeguard the value of his inheritance. Nevertheless, foreign 
or native, they all faced very similar problems of supporting an 
expensive military establishment upon the shoulders of a local 
people who were, at the least, bitterly resentful towards what 
they considered to be a reversion to the bad old days of arbitrary 
lordship. At worst, there was rebellion. It now seems likely that 
the spark which, in the spring of 1358, ignited that famous but 
short-lived peasant revolt known as the Jacquerie, was the breach 
of the ancient customs of Saint-Leu-d'Esserent by military captains 
in the service of the regent.52 The licences to plunder which the 
regent issued to his captains in lieu of wages, together with the 
ruthless exploitation of the local taille, the seigneurial revenues 
from tolls and from justice, the revival of forced labour to repair 
castle-walls and of watch-service on their battlements, attracted 
the murderous wrath of the common people. It was a return to 
serfdom, and it mattered not at all whether the new lords were 
the French king's friends or his enemies. "Then came war to the 
French kingdom", said the spokesman for the fourth hierarchy 
in Philippe de MeziE:!res' Songs du Vieil Pelerin, "which made us 
serfs instead of freemen. We were afflicted, not only by the sword 
of our English enemies, but by our own lords too. \Ve were all 
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oppressed by gq~elles, t:ailles, taxes, watch-duties; by pillage 
and servitude ... ";1,3 
There was, of course, more to the "lordly" to which 
all men-at-arms aspired than mere self-interest in a material 
sense. Lords not only needed the support in goods and services 
of the local people, but they also it as a !'ight; not only 
did they need to keep their castle a proper state of tlefence 
as they were commanded to do by the r·oyal bailli for their own 
protection, but they expected to be able to live in a certain style 
which went far beyond bare necessities. "The~' wor·e pea!'ls on 
their hoods or on their gilded and silver girdles", wrote the hotTified 
Jean de Venette, in 1356, "and elaborately adorned themselves 
from head to foot with gems and precious stones. So assiduously 
did all (nobles and knights), from the least to the greatest, cover 
themselves with these luxuries that pearls and other precious 
stones weie sold for high prices and could hardly be found at all 
in Paris.";)4 i\ poor squire who suddenly found himself at the 
head, or even simply a part, of a successful company in a profitable 
garrison, quickly surrounded himself with the trappings of an 
aristocratic household: squires, pages, chaplains, varlets, many 
of whom may have been, quite literally, kidnapred in the villages 
and on the public highways in the vicinity of the fortress. The 
Englishman, Jack Spore, who found himself in possession of a 
ten-year-old boy after a raid on the village of Saint Julien-du-Sault, 
and who could find no-one to pay his ransom, "had him mounted 
on a horse. charged with his lance ancl bascinet, and made him 
his page".55 The rnen-at-arms of the Hundred Years War, moreover, 
brought with them to the war a certain attitude to the peasantry 
which can only be described as a suspicion bot'clering on outright 
hostility (or, if they did not br·ing it with thc-:1:. thn· quicklv ncquir·ecl 
it). Lords who became men-at-arms, and therefore maiLres ciu 
sol in a new, war-time, sense, harboured a certain bitterness bred 
of an ancient, and by-and-large a losing, struggle to revive their 
failing fortune in the face of peasant solidarity and 
r·esistance. They treated the peasants in their· areas of 
operation with a ruthlessness which moralists found difficult to 
understand, and which appeared to these latter as a malicious 
delight in the sufferings of defenceless non-combatants. lt may, 
indeed, have been an exquisite pleasur·e for these lords to exercise 
a "pure" form of lordship, uncomplicated by ancient and undesirable 
customs: to be able to respond to sig·ns of pensant resistance and 
rebellion with the m<lssive show of force which they were incapable 
of mobilizing at home and in peace-time. :\ glorious retur·n to 
the primitive simplicities of the "first feudal age"'! 
Tile similarities between the conditions of French society 
during· the lfundrcd Years War and those which :llcn·c Bloch clairnecl 
for western Eur·ope during his "fir:<t l'cud<ll age". - and which had 
been dead for thn:c hundred years, at lenst, - nrc nothing· short 
of r·crnarkablc. We nlt'eady hnve had cause to notice the clrnmatic 
decline in population which coinciciccl, albeit with internal 
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of that war; also the concentration 
in the villages and on the lands 
them. The reduction "to insignificance" 
function wages the first feudal age, which 
either to take men into their own households 
in return for (their) services, estates which, 
directly or in the form of dues levied on the cultivators 
soil, would enable (them) to provide for (themselves)",56 
has unexpected parallels with the conditions of garrisons during 
the Hundred Years War in France. Although the wages paid to 
(the peasant in Alain 
that the taxes which had 
would have been sufficient to 
buy be no doubt but that the great 
of France and of were 
to grant to their captains "estates" in lieu wages, or 
to tolerate appropriation of such "estates" by men 
in their service. One may wonder, too whether the indentured 
liveried retainers of the so-called Bastard Feudalism 
of the late ages were not similar to the practice of 
men into their own households the war-lords of the first 
age. If the first feudal was characterized by the 
of royal of and taxation by private 
so too was French society in the late Middle Ages. 
If the collapse of central government in Charlemagne's empire, 
after his death, took the form of local potentates claiming regal 
for their of the district: so too was 
of royal France under the Valois kings. 
romance in 
next meal was 
to that this "feudalization" of 
short-lived phenomenon 
standards: "manors" changed hands so frequently 
occupants were able to establish permanent 
when lost and in need 
was ultimately to reassert itself over 
To ignor·e such feudaliza tion however, 
exclusively warrior dream-world of chivalric 
lived without a thought for where their 
from, and whose only use for peasants was 
directions. 
There are good reasons why few historians will allow "feudalism" 
more than an "bastard", status in the world of 
late-medieval Europe: the general of wages or other 
financial advantages, in r·eturn for service, had so eroded 
the primitive centrality of the fief opened up so many 
avenues for the gwwth of centralized bureaucracy, that 
Prance can no be viewed as a "feudal" society. 
But the France of the first five Valois kings, the France of the 
Hundred Year·s War, was a different society from the one 
inherited from Saint Louis son and grandson. The fragility 
of the Capetian structure was exposed, and the febrile growth 
of royal power within the kingdom was imperilled by a collapsing 
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economy and a revived provincialism. Such circumstances 
represented a crisis for the French Monarchy, and for those, 
non-combatant, elements of French society which depended for 
their security and well-being on strong, centralized, government. 
But, far from representing a "crisis" of "feudalism", the demographic 
and political crisis of this period, in significant ways, revived 
its failing fortunes. It placed a premium on forms of association 
between members of the military aristocracy and it allowed 
individual members of that small group the opportunity to 
appropriate to themselves the power of the State in the localities. 
Whether we allow "feudalism" only into the world of aristocratic 
military associations, or permit it an extended role in the area 
of the economic exploitation by warriors over peasant-producers, 
the "crisis" of the late Middle Ages in France was "feudalism's" 
opportunity. 
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